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STATE OF UTAH,
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vs.
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DAVID A. VARNER,
Petitioner/Appellant.

COMES NOW, petitioner, by and through L. Long, lawyer of
record, and hereby Petitions this court to review the Court of
Appeals decision rendered on the 12th day of December, 1989,
wherein the court summarily affirmed defendant's conviction.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The record clearly indicates that Officer Leary

obtained defendant's consent to a blood test by use of coercion,
deception, and chicanery by disguising his request as being
merely for his investigation of the accident.
2.

The defendant's acquiescence to the officer's request

was under a pretense that he would not go to jail, and the
purpose of the blood test was for "investigation."

The officer

cloaked the criminal investigation for DUI with his need for

information to complete his report about the accident.
3.

The officer discreetly implied that the blood test was

a formality with his investigation of the events, and used the
defendant's state of confusion to his advantage to obtain the
necessary consent.
ARGUMENT
In order to support the State's contention that the
defendant gave "actual consent" to the blood test, they relied
solely on the testimony of Officer Leary.
offered.

No other testimony was

This court concluded that the defendant did not present

any evidence that would ha\/& contradicted the testimony of the
officer; however, defendant maintains that the record establishes
that the officer's testimony was clearly erroneous and
inconsistent as established on cross-examination.

The trial

court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the blood
test.
The defendant submits for review certain excerpts of the
transcript from the hearing on the motion to suppress, held on
the 6th day of July, 1989, attached hereto and by this reference
made a part hereof, as follows:
Page 6, line 20 through page 8, line 10.
Direct examination by Kimberly Hornak
Q.
(By Ms. Hornak) Now, you talked to him and
you noticed the injury. Did you make any other
observations about his appearance?
A.
(Officer Leary) Yes, I did. While I was
talking to him there was a, what appeared to be a strong
odor of alcohol emitting from his person. While talking
to him, I advised him that for investigative purposes
I'd like to—have him consent to a blood test. This was
while he was standing next to his vehicle. He indicated
2

to m e , yes, tl iat would be fine, he's got no problem with
that. That's about the time that I went back to my car
to start the paperwork,
Q.
Now, at some point then did you accompany him
to the hospital or —
A.
I didn't accompany him to the — with him to
the hospital. He went to the hospital in the ambulance.
After the scene was cleared up and I responded from the
scene to the hospital, I again made contact with him in
the suture room at St. Mark's Hospital.
Q
And what did you do when you made contact with
him on that occasion?
A.
I asked him if Iie remembered who I was at the
scene of the accident and asked him if he remembered
that I asked him if he'd consent to a blood test. He
indicated that he remembered who I w a s , that he would —
that he told me that he wanted to consent to a blood
test at the scene of the accident. He became hesitant
at this point, indicating that he didn't want to go to
jail. I advised him that with the investigation of the
accident, he was not going to go to jail, that the
hospital was going to attend to his injuries.
I asked him that — if he still wanted to take
the blood test; again he indicated that he, you know,
didn't want to go to jail. I advised him that the blood
test was for investigative purposes only and I said to
him that "you don't have to take the test if you don't
want to."
He started talking, started rambling about the
accident, that he was following some friends, et cetera.
About that same time the doctor started to work on his
injuries, clean up one of his wounds, he indicated to me
at that point that he'd like to take the test. A blood
test was then given. (Emphasis added)
!he record is clear that the officer advised the defendant
that the "blood test was for investigative purposes only."

How-

ever, it is apparent that the officer inferred this to mean that
the purposes were for investigation of the accident and not the
possible criminal ramifications.

The defendant was not advised

that t:I ie i esu 11s wc i 11! J be \ i• $ed against I ii n i to pr ove that he was in
fact under the influence of alcohol, but only that the blood
3

sample was part of the investigation.

A phlegmatic individual

without sufficient information to understand the consequences of
consent to an officer's request is placed in an unfair advantage,
and any evidence retrieved by the officer was obtained by deceit
per

se.

The officer testified under cross-examination, as contained
on page 25, beginning at line 12, that:
THE WITNESS:
...When I first arrived at the
hospital, he indicated —
or I asked him if he
remembered who I was and, again, I asked him if he
would take the blood test. At that point we started to
have a conversation concerning the going to jail part.
And throughout that conversation I believe I asked him
again or advised him again that he did not have to take
the blood test although I would like him to consent to
the blood test for my investigative purposes. I can't
recall if I asked him three or four hundred times
through that conversation or not. It was a conversation
that he and I were having about going to jail. He
started rambling on and on about the accident, what
caused the accident, about his friends, et cetera. And
then all of a sudden he blurted out, "Yes, I'll take the
test,
This court should take specific notice of the officer's
testimony in the last sentence of each quoted sections above.

The

first indicates that the defendant merely agreed to take the test;
however, the second mentions that he "all of a sudden blurted out"
that he would take the test.

This comment by the officer could be

construed as merely a statement made under the pressure of fervent
interrogation by defense counsel, and that the officer exaggerated
his opinion of the events.

Was this an involuntary eruption of

excited response to the questioning; or, a more likely scenario
of the events that transpired at the hospital to elicit consent
from the defendant ?
4

The sole issue before this court is whether or not the
consent LJ l^w^

ihe test was voluntary, or that the consent was

finally ootai > - • ->'••
purposes,

, -c-.-^i-y . - ^ -r sati or i aboi jt investigative

On closer inspection

:*• this issue, the relevant point

is intelligibly the term "voluntary."

That term is defined as

"unimpe11ed h f another's influence, spontaneous, acting of oneself...The word, especially in statutes, often iniplies knowledge
of essential facts."

81ack's Law Dictionary 1413 (5th Edition

1979).
This court is constantly faced wiU. u-e

f

i ue lirie between

actual and voluntary consent as opposed to conservt given under
exigent circumstances.

The well trained officer in the field

incorporates the "good buddy" attitude into his investigation for
criminal activity.

The defendant's memorandum in supporI of his

motion to suppress cited In Interest of I., R.L., 739 P.2d 1123
(Utah App. 1987) which stated as follows:
An officer's demand that a non-arrested motorist submit
to a chemical test may lead to arbitrary and unreasonable
action by police officers, and to a potentially unconstitutional search and seizure. However the constitutional right
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures may
be waived if the defendant gives actual consent to the
search in question.
Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but should be shown by clear and convincing evidence,
and any consent must be voluntary and uncoerced,
either physically or psychologically. 68 Am.Jur. 2d
Searches and Seizures, § 46 (1973).(emphasis mine)
The basic premise of actual consent is an element that the
courts should not "lightly infer."
an individual, as in Mr

The distiraction is drawn when

Varner's position, consents while under

the tactful interrogation for the premise of constructing a
5

report.

The officer's assurance that he would not go to jail is

insufficient to justify the officer's approach to obtain consent.
Furthermore the court determined that the defendant, in In
Interest of I,. R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987), did not give
his actual consent, and stated:
There was nothing in his demeanor or behavior
indicating actual consent. On the contrary, he
offered some resistance to the taking of blood.
Further, no one informed him that blood was being
taken for purposes of determining blood alcohol
content...Therefore, we conclude that the police
failed to follow proper procedures and were not
justified in requiring appellant to submit to the
blood test.
Also, under the circumstances, reasonable minds
could conclude that blood was being withdrawn for
medical rather than law-enforcement purposes.
In the instant case, the officer finally obtained a verbal
agreement to the taking of the blood; however, the defendant
offered some resistance to the blood test, and he was not informed
that the purpose was for determining alcoholic content to
establish criminal charges.
It would appear from the above passage that two critical
ingredients were necessary in determining if consent was voluntary
or impliedly compelled from the defendant.

The first was that the

defendant offered some resistance to the request for the blood
test.

In the case at bar, attention is focused on the testimony

of the officer under cross-examination as contained on page 21,
beginning at line 19, as follows:
Q.
And you stated here today under direct
examination that you said you told him he didn't
have to take the test if he didn't want to after he
expressed a reluctance to take it; is that right?
6

A.
He didn't — he did not express a reluctance
to take the test. He indicated that he didn't want
to go to jail. If you interpret that as a
reluctance to take the test, then I guess that's
your interpretation. But he didn't outright say he
did not want to take the test.
Q.
Now, you wrote h&re — let me direct your
attention to line — line 10, the end of line 10
there that has writing on it at least where you say
"he was hesitant in taking the blood test." Is
that what you meant when you wrote it down?
A.
He was hesitant in taking the blood test,
thinking I was going to take him to jail.
Q.
But you just testified that he was reluctant
to go to jail. Everybody's reluctant to go to
jail. But he was even reluctant to take the blood
test, wasn't he?
A.

That's what it indicates here, yes.

The above passage unquestionably identifies that the
defendant "offered some resistance" to the officer's request to
take the blood test.

This court has determined the consent issue

based on semantics alone, and has failed to draw the line at the
point when an officer can continue with his veiled approach to
obtain consent without constitutional violations.
The second ingredient to this issue is that the defendant was
not informed that the purpose of the test was to establish a blood
alcohol content for possible criminal charges.

The officer

delicately avoided any discussion regarding the use of the test
other than for "investigative purposes."

The defendant was not in

a position to make an informed decision that directly related to
his constitutional right against self incrimination.

The officer

skirted the issue and down-played the necessity of the test which
would eventually be used to prosecute the defendant.
7

It would appear, as applied to this case, that coercion
construed as thumb screws to elicit a confession.

is

Coercion can

be equally evoked through psychological means to obtain an end
result.

The officer used the defendant's state of mind and the

situation to his advantage to elicit the necessary consent.
CONCLUSION
The defendant maintains that the officer intentionally used
the situation to elicit the consent to take the blood test.

The

defendant was in no condition to make an informed decision based
on his right to know why blood would be taken.

If this court

allows officers in the field to extract blood from unweary and
uninformed individuals based on the premise of mere investigation,
then the constitution will be superseded by inventive methods to
get around the individuals right to make a choice when one is
apparent.
THE PRICE FOR FREEDOM IS CONSTANT VIGILANCE.
RESPECTFULLY SU8MITTED this 2Az^

day of December, 1989.

^0>*e
L. Long
Lawyer for Defendant/Petitioner
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for Rehearing was delivered to the person or entity listed below:
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Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Q.

And did you investigate this accident?

A.

Yes, I did,

Q.

And what did you do as a part of your

investigation?
A.

Well, I made contact with Mr, Varner at the

scene of the accident.
personnel.

He was being attended to by emergency]

He had a laceration about his head, some

8

lacerations about his face.

9

contact with him, he was standing, being held up by part of

He was —

when I first made

10

his vehicle, he was basically sitting on the portion of

11

his vehicle.

12

him if he was a driver; he indicated he was.

13

the pertinent information: driver's license, registration,

14

et cetera; he produced a valid Utah driver's license.

Paramedics were looking at him.

I asked
I asked for

The

•5 J registration, I believe, and the insurance information
16

was still in the car.

17

stuff out of the car so I proceeded to get it out of the

18

car for him, at which time I let the paramedics work on

19

him and then I went back to my car to start the paperwork.

20

ft

Now, you talked to him and you noticed the

21

injury.

22

appearance?

23
24
25

A.

He was in no condition to get that

Did you make any other observations about his

Yes, I did.

While I was talking to him there

was a, what appeared to be a strong odor of alcohol emitting
from his person.

While talking to him, I advised him that

*

for investigative purposes I'd like to —
to a blood test.
his vehicle.

*

have him consent

This was while he was standing next to

He indicated to me, yes, that would be fine,

he's got no problems with that.

That's about the time

5 J that I went back to my car to start the paperwork.
6

ft

Now, at some point then did you accompany him

^ j to the hospital or —
* I

A.

I didn't accompany him to the —

' J the hospital.

with him to

He went to the hospital in the ambulance,

'0 I After the scene was cleared up and I responded from the
11 I scene to the hospital, I again made contact with him in
12 I the suture room at St. Mark's Hospital.
13
1*
15
16

ft

And what did you do when you made contact with

him on that occasion?
ft.

i asked him if he remembered who I was at the

scene of the accident and asked him if he remembered that

17 j I asked him if he'd consent to a blood test.
18

that he remembered who I was, that he would —

He indicated
that he

19 I told me that he wanted to consent to a blood test at the
20 I scene of the accident.

He became hesitant at this point,

21 I indicating that he didn't want to go to jail.

I advised

*2

him that with the investigation of the accident, he was

23

not going to go to jail, that the hospital was going to

24

25

j attend to his injuries.
I asked him that —

if he still wanted to take

1

the blood test; again he indicated that he, you know, didn't

2
3

want to go to jail.

I advised him that the blood test

J was for investigative purposes only and I said to him that
"you don't have to take the test if you don't want to."

*
6

He started talking, starting rambling about
I the accident, that he was following some friends, et cetera

7

About that time the doctor started to work on his injuries,

8
8
J clean up one of his wounds, he indicated to me at that

9

point that he'd like to take the test.

10

A blood test was

then given

11

Q.

Now, did you make a decision as to who was

*2 I at fault in the accident?
13

I

A.

At a later time I did, when I was able to contact):

14

the witness in person.

15

was handed a witness statement.

16

witness at the time of the accident.

17

Q.

18

that accident?

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A.

At the scene of the accident I
I never did talk to a

And was somebody cited for being at fault in

Yes.

Well, they weren't exactly cited.

The

information was drawn up, yes.
Q.

All right.

Who was that?

A.

That would be Mr. Varner.

Q.

All right.

Now, when you say Mr. Varner, you

refer to this gentleman sitting over here?
A.

I'm referring to the defendant at defendant's

I

twice to take the test; once at the scene, once at the

2

hospital.

3

or three times about the fact that he could refuse."

4

Mr. Long's wondering if you only asked him twice how you

5

get talking about refusal two or three times, it doesn't

6

seem to add up.

7

THE WITNESS:

8
9

And then you said, "Well, I talked to him two
So

I agree.

THE COURT: And so he's curious how that —
how you could testify that way.

10

THE WITNESS:

Okay.

At the scene of the accident}

11

I asked Mr. Varner if he would consent to a blood test.

12

He indicated that he would.

13

hospital, he indicated —

14

who I was and, again, I asked if he would take the blood

15

test.

16

concerning the going to jail part. And throughout that

17

conversation I believe I asked him again or advised him

18

again that he did not have to take the blood test although!

19

I would like him to consent to the blood test for my

20

investigative purposes.

21

three or four hundred times through that conversation or

22

not.

23

the going to jail.

24

the accident, what caused the accident, about his friends,

25

et cetera. And then all of a sudden he blurted out, "Yes,

When I first arrived at the

or I asked him if he remembered

At that point we started to have a conversation

I can't recall if I asked him

It was a conversation that he and I were having about
He started rambling on and on about

25

1

I'll take the test."

2
3

I can't recall specifically how many times
through that conversation I talked to him.

4

Q.

(By Mr. Long)

6

A.

Five minutes, maybe.

7

Q.

And you don' t know —

5

8

go on?

if he'd been given —

9
10
11

How long did this conversation

you didn' t check to see

can I continue or

THE COURT:

—

She'll tell you if there's a problem

She's real good that way, so it must be okay.
Q.

(By Mr. Long)

So during this five-minute

12

conversation, you hadn't checked to see if he was under

13

any medication?

14

k

No, I hadn't.

15

Q.

And so he was progressively rambling on and

16
17

on as you were talking?
A.

18

Basically.
MS. HORNAK:

19

what he testified to.

20

MR. LONG:

21

MS. HORNAK:

22
23

Objection.

I don't think that's

He used the word "rambling."
He never said he was progressively

rambling.
THE COURT:

Well, the word progressively, I

24

don' t know what that means and I think she 's objecting to

25

this characteristic "progressively rambling."

26

1

admonitions for refusing, wouldn't you?

2

A.

Yes, sir.

3

a

But you didn't do that, did you?

4

A.

Nope.

5

MS. HORNAK:

Your Honor, I'm really sorry,

6

but I have anappointment.

7

to make a phone call?

8

THE COURT:

9

MS. HORNAK:

Could I take a brief recess

Sure.
I really apologize for this.

10

[Brief recess.]

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. LONG:

13

ft

Mr. Long.
Thank you, your Honor.

Now, it's true, is it not, that he went by

14

ambulance to the hospital and you didn't go in the hospital,

15

you

—

16

A.

Yes.

17

0

—

18

A.

By my patrol vehicle, yes.

19

ft

And you stated then here today under direct*

you went by your own means.

20

examination that you said you told him he didn't have to

21

take the te st if he didn't want to after he expressed a

22

reluctance to take it; is that right?

23

A.

He didn't —

24

to take the test.

25

go to jail.

he did not express a reluctance

He indicated that he didn't want to

If you interpret that as a reluctance to take

21

1

the test, then I guess that's your interpretation.

2

But

he didn't outright say he did not want to take the test.

3

ft

4

Now, you wrote here —

attention to line —

5

let me direct your

line 10, the end of line 10 there

that has writing on it at least where you say "he was t

6

hesitant in taking the blood test."

7

Is that what you meant

when you wrote it down?

8

A.

9

He was hesitant in taking the blood test, thinkirj

I was going to take him to jail

10

ft

But you just testified that he was reluctant

11

to go to jail.

12

he was even reluctant to take the blood test, wasn't he?

Everybody's reluctant to go to jail.

But

13

K

That's what it indicates here, yes

14

ft

All this time that this is going on, the doctor

15

is sewing up the wound in his head; isn't that right?

16

k

No, the doctor hadn't started sewing up the

" I wound in his head yet
18
19

1

20

ft

But he was sitting there waiting for the doctor

to come and give him a shot of something and start cleaning
out the wound.

21 I
22
I
23

A.

The doctor could have already come and given

him a shot, I don't know.

It was in that time frame, yes.

24
ft

So, in other words, he could have been under

25
the influence of drugs at the time you were asking him
to

—

to make an informed decision as to whether he should
22

